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In the original two-choice minority game (MG), selfish players cooperate with each other even
though direct communication is not allowed. Moreover, there is a periodic dynamics in the MG
whenever the strategy space size is much smaller than the number of strategies at play. Do these
phenomena persist if every player has Nc > 2 choices where all player’s strategies are picked from a
reduced strategy space? We answer this question by studying a multichoice minority game model
known as MG(Nc,|S|). Numerical simulation shows that these two models have very similar global
cooperative behaviors. Nevertheless, unlike in the MG, periodic dynamics does not always appear
in the MG(Nc,|S|) even when the strategy space size is much smaller than the number of strategies
at play.
PACS numbers: 05.65.+b, 02.50.Le, 05.45.-a, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, there is an explosion of research interest in the study of complex adaptive system (CAS). In
fact, examples of CAS are ubiquitous in our complex and complicated world. Ecosystems, nervous system, banking
industry, organism and economic systems like stock markets are all examples of CAS. The study of CAS allowed
us to investigate how rich, complicated pattern structure or behavior emerged from collection of relatively simple
components.
So, what are the essential features of a complex adaptive system? According to Levin [1], CAS must have three
essential elements: (i) sustained diversity and individuality of components, (ii) localized interactions among those
components and (iii) an autonomous process that selects from among those components, based on the results of local
interactions, a subset for replication or enhancement.
In the framework of CAS, econophysicists study the collective behavior of economic system by building up simple
model using statistical mechanical and nonlinear physical methods. In particular, minority game (MG) [2, 3] is a
simple model of economic system composed of adaptive and inductive reasoning agents, which successfully captures
the minority seeking behavior in a free market economy. This game was proposed by Challet and Zhang under the
inspiration of the El Farol bar problem introduced by the theoretical economist Arthur [4].
MG is a toy model of N inductive reasoning players who have to choose one out of two alternatives independently
in each turn by their current best working strategies or mental model. Those who end up in the minority side (that is,
the choice with the least number of players) win. Although its rules are remarkably simple, MG shows a surprisingly
rich self-organized collective behavior [5, 6, 7]. To explain the dynamics of MG, Hart et al. introduced the so-called
crowd-anticrowd theory [8, 9]. Their theory stated that fluctuations arisen in the MG is controlled by the interplay
between crowds of like-minded agents and their perfectly anti-correlated partners.
Numerical simulation as well as the crowd-anticrowd theory [5, 6, 7] showed that the global behavior of MG depends
on three parameters: (i) the number of players N , (ii) the number of strategies S each player has and (iii) the number
of the most recent minority sides M that a strategy depends on. Global cooperation, as indicated by the fact that
average number of players winning the game each time is larger than that where all players make their choice randomly,
is observed whenever 2M+1 ≈ NS [5, 6, 7]. Is it true that global behavior of MG is determined once N , S and M
are fixed? Specifically, we ask if it is possible to lock the system in a global cooperative phase for any fixed values of
N , S and M . We can do so by studying the multichoice minority game — a variant of the MG in which players have
Nc > 2 choices. In our previous work, we have answered the above question by building up a multichoice minority
game model called MG(Nc,N
2
c ) where Nc is the number of player’s choice [10]. In MG(Nc,N
2
c ), all strategies are
picked from a reduced strategy space consisting of N2c mutually anti-correlated and uncorrelated strategies only. We
found that it is possible to keep (almost) optimal cooperation amongst the players in almost the entire parameter
space since the MG(Nc,N
2
c ) model can be readily extended to MG(Nc,N
k
c ) model for integer k ∈ [3,M + 1].
On the other hand, it was found that the dynamics of the MG is dominated by a period-2 · 2M dynamics whenever
2M+1 ≪ NS, i. e. in the overcrowding phase [6, 11, 12]. In this phase, the strategy space size is much smaller than the
number of strategies at play and thus each strategy is used by a large number of players. It is such an overcrowding
effect which leads to the period-2 · 2M dynamics in this phase. However, will the periodic dynamics also appear in
the overcrowding phase of a multichoice minority game?
In this paper, we would like to continue our previous study by investigating the global cooperation of players in the
multichoice minority game model known as MG(Nc,|S|). Besides, we also investigate the dynamics in the overcrowding
2phase of such multichoice minority game model. In Section II, we give a general formalism for constructing the
MG(Nc,|S|) model. Numerical simulation results on the dynamics and also global cooperation of our model are
reported and discussed in Section III. Lastly, we sum up by giving a brief conclusion in Section IV.
II. THE MODEL
In this Section, we would like to show how to construct the MG(Nc,|S|) model. It is a generalized MG model where
all players have Nc ≥ 2 choices and they all pick strategies from the reduced strategy space S with size |S| = N
k
c
for integer k ∈ [2,M + 1]. (Note that a reduced strategy space is only consisted of strategies which are significantly
different from each other.) Here we assume that Nc is a prime power and we label the Nc alternatives as the Nc
elements in the finite field GF (Nc).
In this repeated game, there are N heterogeneous inductive reasoning players whose aim is to maximize one’s own
profit from the game. In every turn, each player has to choose one out of Nc alternatives while direct communication
with others is not allowed. The minority choice, denoted as Ω(t) at time t, is simply the choice chosen by the least
non-zero number of players in that turn. (In case of a tie, the minority choice is chosen randomly amongst the choices
with the least non-zero number of players.) The players of the minority choice will gain one unit of wealth while all
the other lose one. The only public information available to all players is the so-called history (Ω(t−M), . . . ,Ω(t−1))
which is the Nc-ary string of the minority choice of the last M turns. The history can only take on L ≡ N
M
c different
states. We label these states by an index µ = 1, . . . , L and denote the history (Ω(t−M), . . . ,Ω(t − 1)) by the index
µ(t). In fact, players can only interact indirectly with each other through the history µ(t).
However, how does each player decide his/her own choice in the game using inductive reasoning? He/She does so
by employing strategies to predict the next minority choice according to the history where a strategy is a map sending
individual history µ to the choice {0, 1, . . . , Nc− 1}. We represent a strategy s by a vector ~s ≡ (χ
1
s, χ
2
s, . . . , χ
L
s ) where
χµs is the prediction of the minority choice by the strategy s for the history µ as illustrated in Table I.
TABLE I: The prediction of the minority choice χµs by the strategy ~s ≡ (0, 1, 2, 2, 1, 0, 1, 2, 0) where Nc = 3 and M = 2.
history µ prediction χµs
(0,0) 0
(0,1) 1
(0,2) 2
(1,0) 2
(1,1) 1
(1,2) 0
(2,0) 1
(2,1) 2
(2,2) 0
In MG(Nc,|S|), each player is assigned once and for all S randomly drawn strategies from the reduced strategy
space S. At each time step, each player uses his/her own best working strategies to guess the next minority choice.
But how do players decide which strategy is the best? They use the virtual score, which is the hypothetical profit for
a player using a single strategy throughout the game, to evaluate the performance of a strategy. The strategy with
the highest virtual score is considered as the best one.
As mentioned before, all the strategies in MG(Nc,|S|) are drawn from the reduced strategy space S. For |S| = N
k
c
where integer k ∈ [2,M + 1], S is formed by the spanning strategies ~va, ~v
1
u, . . . , ~v
k−1
u as follows:
S = {λa~va +
k−1∑
i=1
λiu~v
i
u : λa, λ
1
u, . . . , λ
k−1
u ∈ GF (Nc)}. (1)
Note that all arithmetical operations here are performed in the finite field GF (Nc). Since Nc is a prime power, S must
be a linear space. Adapted from Ref. [10], the spanning strategies must satisfy the following technical conditions:
vai 6= 0 for all i, (2)
3where vai is the ith element of the vector ~va and by regarding i as a uniform random variable between 1 and L,
Pr(v1ui = j2|vai = j1) = 1/Nc if Pr(vai = j1) 6= 0 for all j1, j2 ∈ GF (Nc),
Pr(v2ui = j3|v
1
ui = j2 and vai = j1) = 1/Nc if Pr(v
1
ui = j2 and vai = j1) 6= 0 for all j1, j2, j3 ∈ GF (Nc),
...
Pr(vk−1ui = jk|v
k−2
ui =jk−1 and . . . and v
1
ui = j2 and vai = j1) = 1/Nc
if Pr(vk−2ui = jk−1 and . . . and v
1
ui = j2 and vai = j1) 6= 0 for all j1, . . . , jk ∈ GF (Nc).
(3)
Under such conditions, we can show that [10]
d(λa1~va + λ
1
u1~v
1
u + · · ·+ λ
k−1
u1 ~v
k−1
u , λa2~va + λ
1
u2~v
1
u + · · ·+ λ
k−1
u2 ~v
k−1
u
= d([λa1 − λa2]~va, [λ
1
u2 − λ
1
u1]~v
1
u + · · ·+ [λ
k−1
u2 − λ
k−1
u1 ]~v
k
u)
=


0 if λa1 = λa2 and λ
1
u1 = λ
1
u2 and . . . and λ
k−1
u1 = λ
k−1
u2 ,
L if λa1 6= λa2 and λ
1
u1 = λ
1
u2 and . . . and λ
k−1
u1 = λ
k−1
u2 ,
L(1− 1/Nc) otherwise.
(4)
It is easy to show that the reduced strategy space S whose size equals Nkc is composed of N
k−1
c distinct mutually
anti-correlated strategy ensembles (namely, those with same λ1u, . . . , λ
k−1
u ); whereas the strategies of each of these
ensembles are uncorrelated with each other. Indeed, the reduced strategy space S has a very beautiful structure since
any two strategies randomly drawn from it are either uncorrelated or anti-correlated with each other [10]. Fig. 1
shows the structure of the reduced strategy space S of MG(Nc,N
2
c ) for Nc = 5.
III. RESULTS
A. Global cooperation of players
We would like to investigate if there is global cooperation of players in the MG(Nc,|S|) model. If the global
cooperation does exist, we want to compare it with that of the minority game. All the results in this part are
taken from 1000 independent runs. In each run, we run 10000 steps starting from initialization before making any
measurements. We have checked that it is already enough for the system to attain equilibrium in all the cases reported
below. Then we took the average values on 15000 steps after the equilibration.
Let us start by first studying the average attendance
〈Ai(t)〉 ≡ lim
T→0
1
T
∑
t
Ai(t) (5)
where the attendance of an alternative Ai(t) is just the number of players chosen that alternative. Although the
attendance of different alternatives are not the same, their long time averages must be equal since there is no prior
bias for any alternative in this game. We observed that the average attendance 〈Ai(t)〉 always converges to N/Nc in
both MG(Nc,N
2
c ) and MG(Nc,N
3
c ) no matter what S, S and M are. It is similar to the case of the MG where the
average attendance always converges to N/2 [2].
In order to evaluate the performance of players in our model, we study the mean variance of attendance over all
alternatives (or simply the mean variance)
Σ2 =
1
Nc
∑
i∈GF (Nc)
[〈(Ai(t))
2〉 − 〈Ai(t)〉
2]. (6)
(We remark that the variance of the attendance of a single alternative was studied for the MG [2].) In fact, the sum
of the variance of all the attendance represents the total loss of players in the game. The variance Σ2, to first order
approximation, is a function of the control parameter α alone [6].
Besides, we will compare the mean variance with that in the random choice game (RCG) in order to evaluate the
significance of the strategies. The RCG is similar to the MG(Nc,|S|) model except that all the players in the RCG
make their own decision simply by tossing their own coin. Indeed, we have showed that the variance is equal to
N(Nc − 1)/N
2
c for every alternative in the RCG [13].
4Since the structure of the strategy space S matches the assumptions of the crowd-anticrowd theory, we expect the
collective behavior of MG(Nc,|S|) should follow the predictions of the theory. Based on our previous work [10], we
found that the crowd-anticrowd theory predicts
Σ2 =
〈
1
Nk−1c
∑
S~ξ
∑
γ∈GF (Nc)

 1
Nc
∑
η 6=γ
(N~ξ,γ −N~ξ,η)


2〉
, (7)
where the mutually anti-correlated strategy ensemble S~ξ = {ξ1~v
1
u + . . . + ξk−1~v
k−1
u + γ~va : γ ∈ GF (Nc)} for
~ξ =
(ξ1, . . . , ξk−1) and N~ξ,γ is the number of players making decision according to the strategy (ξ1~v
1
u+. . .+ξk−1~v
k−1
u +γ~va).
Note that
∑
S~ξ
denotes the sum of the variance over all the mutually anti-correlated strategies ensembles S~ξ. We
should notice that when averaged over both time and initial choice of strategies, variance of attendance of different
alternatives must be equal because there is no prior preference for any alternative in our game.
Fig. 2 displays the mean variance of attendance as a function of the control parameter α ≡ |S|/NS, which is the
ratio of the strategy space size |S| to the number of strategies at play NS, in the MG(Nc,N
2
c ) and MG(Nc,N
3
c ) for
some typical Nc. For MG(Nc,N
2
c ) and MG(Nc,N
3
c ), the mean variance of attendance, Σ
2, exhibits properties similar
to that in the MG irrespective of S, S and M . In particular, the mean variance Σ2 is smaller than the so-called
coin-tossed value (i. e. the corresponding value in the RCG) whenever α ≈ 1. It shows that players cooperate globally
in this parameter range. Moreover, the mean variance predicted by the crowd-anticrowd theory is consistent with our
numerical finding as shown in Fig. 2.
In both MG(Nc,N
2
c ) and MG(Nc,N
3
c ), we found that there is an indication of a second order phase transition. To
check if the phase transition is second order or not, we calculate the order parameter [10, 14]
θ =
1
L
∑
µ
{∑
Ω
[
〈p(Ω|µ)〉 −
1
Nc
]2}
(8)
where 〈p(Ω|µ)〉 denotes the conditional time average of the probability for current minority choice Ω(t) = Ω given
that history µ(t) = µ. In fact, the order parameter measures the bias of player’s decision to any choice for individual
history.
Fig. 3 shows that the order parameter always vanishes in MG(Nc,N
2
c ) and MG(Nc,N
3
c ) when the control parameter
α is smaller than its value corresponding to minimum variance. As a result, we confirm that the phase transition is
a second order one in both MG(Nc,N
2
c ) and MG(Nc,N
3
c ).
In summary, our numerical results show that both MG(Nc,N
2
c ) and MG(Nc,N
3
c ) model always exhibit global
cooperative behavior similar to that in the original MG. Moreover, all these results agree with the prediction of the
crowd-anticrowd theory. Thus it is reasonable for us to believe that the MG(Nc,|S|) model has global cooperative
behavior which agrees with both the original MG and crowd-anticrowd theory. Therefore, we conclude that we have
successfully build up the MG(Nc,|S|) model whenever Nc is a prime power.
By using the MG(Nc,|S|) model, we can always alter the complexity of each strategy in minority game with fixed N ,
S and M while the cooperative behavior still persists. As a result, we can always keep (almost) optimal cooperation
amongst the players in almost the entire parameter space.
B. Dynamics of the game
In MG, there is periodic dynamics when α is small, i. e. in the overcrowding phase [6, 11, 12]. Thus, it is natural
for us to ask whether such periodic dynamics also exists in the overcrowding phase of MG(Nc,|S|).
To investigate the dynamics in MG(Nc,|S|), we would like to look at the correlation in the times series of the
attendance of an alternative. Therefore, we study both the conditional and unconditional autocorrelation functions:
C0(i) =
〈A0(t− i)A0(t)〉 − 〈A0(t− i)〉〈A0(t)〉
〈[A0(t)]2〉 − 〈A0(t)〉2
,
Cµ0 (i) =
〈Aµ0 (j − i)A
µ
0 (j)〉 − 〈A
µ
0 (j − i)〉〈A
µ
0 (j)〉
〈[Aµ0 (j)]
2〉 − 〈Aµ0 (j)〉
2
,
where Aµ0 (j) is the attendance of the room-0 for the jth occurrence of the history µ. Here we calculate the correlation
functions for the room-0 only as the correlation should be the same for all the alternatives since there is no prior bias
for any alternative in our game.
5We observed that both C0(i) and C
µ
0 (i) fluctuate greatly in different runs of the game with the same configuration.
Such phenomenon is probably due to the incomplete exploration of the history space for particular initial configura-
tions. Since we are only interested in studying the generic properties of the autocorrelation functions, we averaged
C0(i) and C
µ
0 (i) over 50 independent runs to eliminate the effect of the initial configuration. In each run, we took the
average values on 1000L steps after running 500L steps for equilibrium starting from initialization.
Before moving further on, let us introduce a concept called the prediction vector. The prediction vector ~π(µ) of
a history µ is simply a vector consisted of all the predictions of the minority choice for that history given by each
strategies of the (full/reduced) strategy space used in MG or MG(Nc,|S|). Specifically, ~π(µ) ≡ (χ
µ
τ0
, . . . , χµτ|S|−1) in
MG(Nc,|S|) where τj = (λa~va + λ
1
u~v
1
u + . . . + λ
k−1
u ~v
k−1
u ) for j = (λ
k−1
u N
k−1
c + . . .+ λ
1
uNc + λa). Table II shows the
prediction vectors in the MG(Nc,N
2
c ) with M = 2 and Nc = 3 for a typical strategy space S.
TABLE II: The prediction vectors in the MG(Nc,N
2
c ) with M = 2 and Nc = 3 where the strategy space S is formed by the
spanning strategies ~va ≡ (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) and ~v
1
u ≡ (0, 1, 2, 0, 1, 2, 0, 1, 2).
history µ prediction vector ~π(µ)
(0,0) (0,1,2,0,1,2,0,1,2)
(0,1) (0,1,2,1,2,0,2,0,1)
(0,2) (0,1,2,2,0,1,1,2,0)
(1,0) (0,1,2,0,1,2,0,1,2)
(1,1) (0,1,2,1,2,0,2,0,1)
(1,2) (0,1,2,2,0,1,1,2,0)
(2,0) (0,1,2,0,1,2,0,1,2)
(2,1) (0,1,2,1,2,0,2,0,1)
(2,2) (0,1,2,2,0,1,1,2,0)
There is an interesting relationship between the prediction vector and the history under special circumstances.
For some strategy spaces, the prediction vector of each history µ(t) ≡ (Ω(t − M), . . . ,Ω(t − 1)) in MG(Nc,N
k
c )
is uniquely determined by one of the following vectors alone: ~Λ(t − M), ~Λ(t − M − 1), . . ., ~Λ(t − k + 1) where
~Λ(t) = (Ω(t), . . . ,Ω(t + k − 2)). For example, suppose the spanning strategies of the strategy space S are ~va ≡
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) and ~v1u ≡ (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2) in the MG(Nc,N
2
c ) with M = 2 and Nc = 3. Then the prediction
vector are (0, 1, 2, 0, 1, 2, 0, 1, 2), (0, 1, 2, 1, 2, 0, 2, 0, 1) and (0, 1, 2, 2, 0, 1, 1, 2, 0) for histories in which Ω(t− 2) equals 0,
1 and 2 respectively. In this case, the prediction vector of an arbitrary history µ(t) is uniquely determined by Ω(t−2).
We examined the behavior of Cµ0 (i) in the overcrowding phase for MG(Nc,N
2
c ) and MG(Nc,N
3
c ) with 2 ≤ M ≤ 4
and various strategy spaces. We noticed that Cµ0 (i) exhibits periodic features only in MG(Nc,N
3
c ) with M = 2 no
matter what strategy space S is used. Such observation indicates periodic dynamics of individual history persists in the
MG(Nc,N
3
c ) game with M = 2. For other studied games, the values of C
µ
0 (i > 1) are very small and sometimes even
Cµ0 (1) is nearly zero. These observations suggest only the dependence between consecutive A
µ
0 (j) is non-negligible in
these MG(Nc,|S|) games.
On the contrary, we observed that Cµ0 (i) is a period-2 function of i in the overcrowding phase of the 2-choice MG
for any history µ. It originates from the persistence of a period-2 dynamics for every possible history in this game
[11]. In the overcrowding phase, there is a high probability for a player to employ similar strategies since the number
of strategies at play is much larger than the strategy space size. As a result, for odd occurence of each history, every
player has the same probability for choosing any alternative which results in A0(odd t) ≈ N/2. Moreover, on the
even occurence of each history, every players must choose the alternative which is the minority choice of the last odd
occurence of the same history and thus A0(even t) is either ≪ N/2 or ≫ N/2. If this periodic dynamics can persist,
Cµ0 (i) must be a period-2 function of i in the overcrowding phase of the 2-choice MG for any history µ. In fact, there
is a similar period-Nc dynamics for each history of the Nc-choice MG with Nc > 2 in which the full strategy space is
used (see fig. 4).
We expect there is period-Nc dynamics for every possible history in the overcrowding phase of MG(Nc,|S|) due to its
similarity with the MG. However, why the period-Nc dynamics cannot always persist in our game? Such phenomenon
is resulted from the “interference” of the periodic dynamics of individual history. In MG(Nc,N
k
c ), each prediction
vector corresponds to more than one history if M > (k − 1) since the prediction vector can only take on Nk−1c to
(Nc − 1)N
k−1
c different states for |S| = N
k
c . Moreover, the virtual scores of all player’s strategies must change in
the same way for those histories with the same prediction vector. As a result, the periodic dynamics of individual
history must “interfere” with those corresponding to the same prediction vector and thus the periodic dynamics
6cannot persist. In addition, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the prediction vector and history for both
the (full/reduced) strategy spaces used in MG and MG(Nc,N
k
c ) with M = k−1. Consequently, the periodic dynamics
of individual history always persist in these games since they no longer “interfere” with each other.
On the other hand, is it possible to have any periodic dynamics in the system of MG and MG(Nc,|S|)? Zheng
and Wang revealed that period-2 · 2M multi-peak structure appears in the unconditional autocorrelation function of
the logarithm change of the attendance of an alternative in the 2-choice MG when α is small [12]. Thus all players
must have similar behavior for every 2 · 2M time steps in such case. In other words, there is always a period-2 · 2M
dynamics in the overcrowding phase of the 2-choice MG. Fig. 5 showed that a period-Nc · N
M
c dynamics also exists
in the overcrowding phase of the Nc-choice MG for Nc > 2 although it is weaker than the periodic dynamics in the
2-choice MG.
In order to study the dynamics in MG(Nc,|S|), we investigated the properties of C0(i) in MG(Nc,N
2
c ) and
MG(Nc,N
3
c ). Figs. 6 to 12 display C0(i) as a function of i for MG(Nc,N
2
c ) with different parameters. We found
that the dynamics of the system in the overcrowding phase of MG(Nc,|S|) is remarkably different from that of MG.
First, C0(i) does not always exhibit periodic features in MG(Nc,|S|) with arbitrary strategy space S which implies
periodic dynamics does not always exist. Moreover, the periodicity of the periodic dynamics in MG(Nc,|S|) (which
is equal to the periodicity of C0(i) as a function of i) is independent of the length of memory M . In particular, we
found that C0(i) is a period-N
k
c function of i in MG(Nc,N
k
c ) with Nc > 2 and 2 ≤ k ≤ 3 whenever the prediction
vector of each history is uniquely determined by one of the following vectors alone: ~Λ(t −M),~Λ(t −M − 1), . . .,
~Λ(t − k + 1) where ~Λ(t) = (Ω(t), . . . ,Ω(t + k − 2)). Besides, these periodic dynamics is observed to be less and less
pronounced for larger Nc and κ if the prediction vector of each history is uniquely determined by ~Λ(t− κ) where the
integer κ ∈ [k − 1,M ].
To understand the dynamics in MG(Nc,|S|), let us start by considering the dynamics of the game for every possible
history. As mentioned before, the virtual scores of all player’s strategies must change in the same manner for those
histories with the same prediction vector and thus the dynamics of the game for these histories cannot be considered
independently. We will consider the dynamics of the game for each possible effective history instead in which those
histories with the same prediction vector are considered to be belonged to the same effective history. We should note
that there are totally Nk−1c distinct effective histories in MG(Nc,N
k
c ) if the prediction vector only takes on N
k−1
c
different states for |S| = Nkc .
In fact, the effective history in MG(Nc,|S|) is analogous to the history in the Nc-choice MG. Thus there should be a
similar period-Nc dynamics for each effective history of MG(Nc,|S|) when α is small. Our numerical findings validates
the existence of such periodic dynamics in MG(Nc,|S|). However, do all effective histories have the same probability of
occurence in the overcrowding phase of MG(Nc,|S|)? It is true only if the prediction vector of each history is uniquely
determined by one of the following vectors alone: ~Λ(t−M), ~Λ(t−M −1), . . ., ~Λ(t−k+1). Under such circumstances,
the current effective history is determined by the corresponding past minority choice(s). In addition, each alternative
must have the same probability to be the minority choice in the overcrowding phase under any history because there
is no prior bias for any alternative and all alternatives can be picked by some of the players for such case. As a result,
all effective histories must have the same probability of occurence for small α in these MG(Nc,|S|) games.
We revealed that there is a period-Nc dynamics for all N
k−1
c effective histories in the overcrowding phase of
MG(Nc,N
k
c ) if the prediction vector only takes on N
k−1
c different states. Moreover, we found that all effective histories
on average appear once per Nk−1c time steps as they all have the same probability of occurence if the prediction vector
of each history is uniquely determined by ~Λ(t − κ) where the integer κ ∈ [k − 1,M ]. Besides, the probability for
any transition of effective history must be the same for such case which lead to no “destructive interference” between
the dynamics of individual effective history. As a results, there is period-Nkc dynamics in the overcrowding phase of
MG(Nc,N
k
c ) under such circumstances.
However, why the period-Nkc dynamics in MG(Nc,N
k
c ) becomes less significant when Nc increases? It is because
the total number of possible evolutionary path in the effective history space increases exponentially with Nc under
the period-Nkc dynamics. Indeed, we have found that the period-N
k
c dynamics become more pronounced if we add
bias to some of the effective history’s evolutionary path by manipulating the payoff function. On the other hand, we
should note that the evolution in the effective history space depends only on Ω(t − κ), . . . ,Ω(t − 1) if the prediction
vector of each history is uniquely determined by ~Λ(t− κ) where the integer κ ∈ [k− 1,M ]. Thus the total number of
possible evolutionary path in the effective history space also increases exponentially with κ and the periodic dynamics
become less pronounced when κ increases.
Nevertheless, we found that C0(i) exhibits peculiar behavior in MG(Nc,N
2
c ) with Nc = 2. In particular, C0(i) shows
a period-N3c multi-peak structure whenever the prediction vector of each history is uniquely determined by Ω(t− 2κ)
for any integer κ ∈ [1, ⌊M/2⌋]. For MG(Nc,N
k
c ), the strategy space is k-dimensional since the strategy space is spanned
by k independent strategies (see eqn. (1)-(3)). Thus the strategy space is 2-dimensional in MG(Nc,N
2
c ) which give
rise to the abnormal properties of C0(i). In addition, there are only 2 choices for Nc = 2 which is remarkably different
7from those games with more than two choices. It is because if a strategy does not choose room-0, then it must choose
room-1 and vice-versa for a 2-choice game. We believe the above two factors lead to the marked difference of the
dynamics of the system in MG(Nc,N
2
c ) with Nc = 2 compared to other MG(Nc,|S|) games with Nc > 2.
In summary, we found that the periodic dynamics only exists in the overcrowding phase for particular reduced
strategy spaces in the MG(Nc,|S|) game. In contrast, the periodic dynamics always appears in the overcrowding
phase for the original MG where all player’s strategies are drawn from the full strategy space.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have successfully build up the MG(Nc,|S|) model whenever Nc is a prime power. It is a generalized
MG model where each players has Nc ≥ 2 choices and all strategies are drawn from the reduced strategy space that
is consisted of uncorrelated and anti-correlated strategies only. Although our MG(Nc,|S|) model is not exactly same
as the MG, its global cooperative behavior is similar to that of the MG no matter what S, S and M are.
However, the dynamics of MG(Nc,|S|) model is remarkably different from that of the MG. For the MG(Nc,|S|), the
periodic dynamics only exists in the overcrowding phase for particular reduced strategy spaces; on the contrary, the
periodic dynamics always appears in the overcrowding phase for the MG.
Indeed, we have only given explanation of the periodic dynamics in the MG(Nc,N
k
c ) model for some of the reduced
strategy spaces in which a periodic dynamics exists. Thus it is instructive for us to find reasonable explanation for
the periodic dynamics in other cases.
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FIG. 2: The mean variance Σ2 versus the control parameter α ≡ |S|/NS in MG(Nc,N
2
c ) with Nc = 37 and MG(Nc,N
3
c ) with
Nc = 16. The solid lines are the predictions of the crowd-anticrowd theory whereas the dashed lines indicate the coin-tossed
value, i. e. the corresponding value in the random choice game.
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FIG. 4: The conditional autocorrelation function Cµ
0
(i) versus i in Nc-choice MG with S = 2, M = 2 and α ≈ 0.06 where
(a) Nc = 2, (b) Nc = 3, (c) Nc = 4, (d) Nc = 5. Our numerical results show that C
µ
0
(i) exhibits similar behavior for all other
histories and M = 3, 4.
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FIG. 5: The autocorrelation function C0(i) versus i in Nc-choice MG with S = 2, M = 2 and α ≈ 0.06 where (a) Nc = 2,
(b) Nc = 3, (c) Nc = 4, (d) Nc = 5. Our numerical results show that C0(i) exhibits similar behavior for M = 3 and 4.
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FIG. 6: The autocorrelation function C0(i) versus i in MG(Nc,N
2
c ) with Nc = 2, S = 2, M = 2 and α ≈ 0.06 where the strategy
space S is formed by the spanning strategies ~va = (1, 1, 1, 1) and (a) ~v
1
u = (0, 1, 0, 1), (b) ~v
1
u = (0, 0, 1, 1), (c) ~v
1
u = (0, 1, 1, 0).
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FIG. 7: The autocorrelation function C0(i) versus i in MG(Nc,N
2
c ) with Nc = 2, S = 2, M = 3 and α ≈ 0.06 where the
strategy space S is formed by the spanning strategies ~va = (1, . . . , 1) and (a) ~v
1
u = (0, 1)
4, (b) ~v1u = (0, 0, 1, 1)
2, (c) ~v1u =
(0, . . . , 0, 1, . . . , 1), (d) irregular ~v1u. Note that the length of a strategy L = N
M
c and (σ)
n denotes the vector of n consecutive
segment σ.
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FIG. 8: The autocorrelation function C0(i) versus i in MG(Nc,N
2
c ) with Nc = 2, S = 2, M = 4 and α ≈ 0.06 where the
strategy space S is formed by the spanning strategies ~va = (1, . . . , 1) and (a) ~v
1
u = (0, 1)
8, (b) ~v1u = (0, 0, 1, 1)
4, (c) ~v1u =
(0, . . . , 0, 1, . . . , 1)2, (d) ~v1u = (0, . . . , 0, 1, . . . , 1), (e) ~v
1
u = (0, 1, 1, 0)
4, (f) irregular ~v1u with the same notation as in Fig.7.
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FIG. 9: The autocorrelation function C0,0(i) versus i in MG(Nc,N
2
c ) with Nc = 3, S = 2, M = 2 and α ≈ 0.06 where the
strategy space S is formed by the spanning strategies ~va = (1, . . . , 1) and (a) ~v
1
u = (0, 1, 2)
3, (b) ~v1u = (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2),
(c) irregular ~v1u with the same notation as in Fig.7.
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FIG. 10: The autocorrelation function C0(i) versus i in MG(Nc,N
2
c ) with Nc = 3, S = 2, M = 3 and α ≈ 0.06 where the
strategy space S is formed by the spanning strategies ~va = (1, . . . , 1) and (a) ~v
1
u = (0, 1, 2)
9, (b) ~v1u = (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2)
3,
(c) ~v1u = (0, . . . , 0, 1, . . . , 1, 2 . . . , 2), (d) irregular ~v
1
u with the same notation as in Fig.7.
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FIG. 11: The autocorrelation function C0(i) versus i in MG(Nc,N
2
c ) with Nc = 3, S = 2, M = 4 and α ≈ 0.06 where the
strategy space S is formed by the spanning strategies ~va = (1, . . . , 1) and (a) ~v
1
u = (0, 1, 2)
27, (b) ~v1u = (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2)
9,
(c) ~v1u = (0, . . . , 0, 1, . . . , 1, 2 . . . , 2)
3, (d) ~v1u = (0, . . . , 0, 1, . . . , 1, 2 . . . , 2), (e) ~v
1
u = (0, 1, 2, 2, 0, 1, 1, 2, 0)
9, (f) irregular ~v1u with
the same notation as in Fig.7.
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FIG. 12: The autocorrelation function C0(i) versus i in MG(Nc,N
2
c ) with S = 2, M = 2 and α ≈ 0.06 for the strategy space
S formed by the spanning strategies ~va = (1, . . . , 1) and ~v
1
u = (0, 1, . . . , Nc − 1)
L/Nc where (a) Nc = 2, (b) Nc = 3, (c) Nc = 4,
(d) Nc = 5, (e) Nc = 7, (f) Nc = 8 with the same notation as in Fig.7. Our numerical results show that C0(i) exhibits similar
periodic behavior in MG(Nc,N
2
c ) with the same settings but M = 3 and 4.
